Cognition in schizophrenia: Past, present, and future  by Green, Michael F. & Harvey, Philip D.
Schizophrenia Research: Cognition 1 (2014) e1–e9
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Schizophrenia Research: Cognition
j ou rna l homepage: ht tp : / /www.sch iz rescogn i t ion.com/Cognition in schizophrenia: Past, present, and futureMichael F. Green a,b,⁎, Philip D. Harvey c,d
a Semel Institute for Neuroscience and Human Behavior, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, USA
b Department of Veterans Affairs, Desert Paciﬁc Mental Illness Research, Education, and Clinical Center, Los Angeles, CA, USA
c Department of Psychiatry, University of Miami Miller School of Medicine, Miami, FL, USA
d Bruce Carter VA Medical Center, Miami, FL, USA⁎ Corresponding author. 760 Westwood Plaza, Rm 77
roscience and Human Behavior, UCLA Los Angeles, CA 9
3376.
E-mail address: mgreen@ucla.edu (M.F. Green).
2215-0013/$ – see front matter © 2014 Elsevier Inc. All
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.scog.2014.02.001a b s t r a c ta r t i c l e i n f oArticle history:
Received 27 December 2013
Accepted 4 February 2014
Available online 20 March 2014
Keywords:
Cognition
Schizophrenia
HistorySchizophrenia Research: Cognition will serve an important function – a place where interests converge and inves-
tigators can learn about the recent developments in this area. This new journal will provide rapid dissemination of
information to people whowill make good use of it. In this initial article, we comment globally on the study of cog-
nition in schizophrenia: how we got here, where we are, and where we are going. The goal of this ﬁrst article is to
place the study of cognition in schizophrenia within a historical and scientiﬁc context. In a ﬁeld as richly textured
as ours it is impossible to hit all the important areas, and we hope the reader will forgive our omissions. Phrased in
cognitive terms, our limited presentation of the past is a matter of selective memory, the present is a matter of se-
lective attention, and the future is a matter of selective prospection. This broad introduction emphasizes that cog-
nition in schizophrenia provides clues to pathophysiology, treatment, and outcome. In fact, the study of cognitive
impairment in schizophrenia has become wholly intertwined with the study of schizophrenia itself.
© 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Here at last – a journal dedicated to the topic of cognition in
schizophrenia: Schizophrenia Research: Cognition. The launch of this
journal raises several questions. First: What took so long? Cognition
in schizophrenia has been a major focus for a very long time. Exactly
how long is somewhat arguable – as seen in the next section, 20, 50,
or 100 years are all acceptable answers. From this long-term histori-
cal context, it is surprising that it took until 2014 for a publisher to
launch a journal focused on cognition in schizophrenia. On the
other hand, one could ask provocatively: why do we even need a
journal dedicated to this topic? While everyone now agrees that cog-
nition in schizophrenia is an important topic, it is so important that it
pervades a wide range of topics. A perusal of schizophrenia-focused
journals such as Schizophrenia Bulletin and Schizophrenia Research
shows that cognition is a feature of many articles, even those that
are not speciﬁcally about cognition, including clinical trials, genetics,
outcome, and neuroscience.
Schizophrenia Research: Cognition is expected to serve an impor-
tant function as an international niche journal – a place where inter-
ests converge and investigators gather well-packaged information. It
is also intended to take scientiﬁc risks. Considering that the journal
is open access and will have a fast turn-around, this journal will be
a place for rapid dissemination of information to people who will
make the most of it. Appropriately for this inaugural issue, the two–361 Semel Institute for Neu-
0024–1759. Tel.: +1 310 268
rights reserved.authors of this paper have been asked to comment on how we got
here, where we are, and where are we going. That is, the goal of
this ﬁrst article is to place the study of cognition in schizophrenia
within a historical and scientiﬁc context. Of course, when the ques-
tions are this broad, the answers are not straight forward. Where
we came from is a matter of perspective, and we really do not know
where we are going with any degree of conﬁdence. But we can
make some good guesses.
We begin with a discussion of the past, fully realizing that some
readers (especially younger ones) will be tempted to skip over any
section that looks overly retro or sentimental. However, the history
of cognition research in schizophrenia is not separable from the histo-
ry of schizophrenia itself.
1. Where we came from
The history of cognition research in schizophrenia can be roughly
carved up into 3 eras: the early clinical observations that occurred in
the beginning of the 1900s, the assessment-based approaches that
emerged after World War II, and the more recent era (roughly the
last 20 years) in which cognition research merged into other disci-
plines. In many ways the three eras are quite distinct in their empha-
ses and their methods, and all reﬂect their contemporaneous
scientiﬁc contexts.
1.1. Clinical observations and formulations in the early 20th century
Until recently, most psychology majors in college were required to
take a course on the history of psychology (usually called “History
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about psychology, one which is that William Wundt is credited with
founding the world's ﬁrst psychology laboratory in Leipzig, Germany
in 1879. Wundt had a long career and trained many students who
served as emissaries and conveyed the principles of experimental
psychology far and wide. One of his disciples was Emil Kraepelin,
who maintained a lifelong interest in psychological phenomena and
its applications to psychiatric disorders. It is Kraepelin's distinction
between schizophrenia (dementia praecox) and bipolar disorder
that continues to be reﬂected in the key diagnostic systems (Diagno-
sis and Statistical Manual, DSM; International Classiﬁcation of Dis-
eases, ICD) up to the present time. His tendency to label, separate,
and divide was not limited to psychiatric disorders; he also noted at-
tentional processing abnormalities in schizophrenia and divided
them into two types (Kraepelin, 1971; Nuechterlein and Dawson,
1984). One was a disorder in active attention (aufmerksamkeit) in
which patients “lose both inclination and ability on their own initia-
tive to keep their attention ﬁxed for any length of time” (pp. 5–6).
The second was an abnormality in passive attention (auffassung) in
which there was an “irresistible attraction to casual external impres-
sion” (pp. 6–7). In modern parlance, we might call active attention
vigilance, and passive attention distractibility. The key point is that
his efforts to classify did not stop at diagnoses, but also included ef-
forts to parse cognition.
If Kraepelin was astute and systematic, Eugen Bleuler was down-
right prescient. Aside from giving schizophrenia its mysterious (and
frequently confusing) name, Bleuler understood at an intuitive level
that cognitive impairment was a core part of the illness (Bleuler,
1950). He started by making an important distinction between two
types of symptoms: fundamental and accessory. Fundamental symp-
toms are essentially cognitive in nature. They were separated into
simple fundamental symptoms, including problems in association, af-
fectivity, and ambivalence. These simple fundamental symptoms
combined to form compound fundamental symptoms, including dis-
turbances in attention. Attention for Bleuler was rather all-
encompassing. It included some features that we would call vigilance,
but also expanded into areas that we might call social withdrawal: “it
is evident that the uninterested or autistically encapsulated patients
pay very little attention to the outer world” (p. 68).
In contrast to fundamental symptoms, accessory symptoms were
derived from fundamental symptoms and they constitute what we
would now call the positive symptoms of schizophrenia: hallucina-
tions, delusions, and behavioral and speech abnormalities. He went
on to say that the fundamental symptoms do not necessarily lead to
being hospitalized. Instead “it is primarily the accessory phenomena
which make his retention at home impossible, or it is they which
make the psychosis manifest and give occasion to require psychiatric
help” (p. 94).
Bleuler made many conceptual contributions, but perhaps most
relevant to this discussion is his view that psychotic symptoms
were secondary to fundamental symptoms, including attentional
problems. His hierarchy of symptoms is counter-intuitive, and unfor-
tunately would soon be forgotten. He speciﬁcally proposed that the
features of illness that were most dramatic, and that necessitated
treatment, were somewhat removed from the disease process. He
even went on to say that their manifestation was arbitrary: “almost
the totality of the heretofore described symptomatology of dementia
praecox is a secondary, in a certain sense, an accidental one” (p. 349).
Along these lines he proposed that the fundamental symptoms were
stable over time, whereas the accessory symptoms waxed and waned.
In the brilliant, ground-breaking, works of Kraepelin and Bleuler
we see the conceptual building blocks of modern studies of cognition.
If scientiﬁc history was linear and progressive, the ﬁeld would have
moved right along to examine the implications of these insights into
the cognition of schizophrenia – but that did not happen. A few nota-
ble thinkers (e.g., K. Goldstein, N. Cameron) continued to focus onpsychological/cognitive phenomenon in schizophrenia with
difﬁcult-to-deﬁne concepts such as “abstraction” and “over-inclusive
thinking” but it was a niche interest (Bolles and Goldstein, 1938;
Cameron, 1939). Instead, much of the focus shifted to the more no-
ticeable and more dramatic “accessory” psychotic symptoms and
the importance of cognition was largely forgotten, temporarily.
1.2. Competing approaches to cognition 1950 – 1980
The post-World War II era was characterized by two distinct,
highly empirical, views of the cognitive problems in schizophrenia.
One view was shaped by experimental psychology and it tried to
characterize and understand schizophrenia in terms of basic psycho-
logical phenomenon (shades of Wundt). This approach is probably
best represented by the famous Biometrics Research Unit at the
New York State Psychiatric Institute at Columbia University, which
was founded by Joseph Zubin in 1954 (Zubin, 1950; Zubin and
Spring, 1977). (No less than 3 organizations bestow awards named
after Joseph Zubin.) The scientiﬁc approach that Zubin and others
from the Biometrics program deﬁned was experimental psychopa-
thology and it sought a theoretical understanding of the etiology of
schizophrenia. Their approach to schizophrenia emphasized objective
measurement and strong experimental methodology. It also relied on
the assumption that the most fruitful way to study the etiology of
psychiatric disorders lies in integrative frameworks that use multiple
levels of analysis simultaneously (i.e., genetic, biological and psycho-
social). This integrative approach is taken for granted now, but was
remarkable in the 1960s when it was proposed. As an example of
this integrative approach, Zubin, Samuel Sutton, and others examined
event related potentials (ERPs) in combination with cognitive tasks
(Sutton et al., 1965). This led to a long-standing productive examina-
tion of ERP abnormalities in schizophrenia, including the P300, a
waveform that is used to reﬂect allocation of attentional processes.
To better decompose psychological processes, a substantial amount
of effort during this era was devoted to understanding very simple
performance-based tasks, such as reaction time (Nuechterlein and
Dawson, 1984). Indeed, reaction time was described as the “closest
thing to a north star of schizophrenia research” (Cancro et al., 1971).
Many studies examined cued reaction time tests in which subjects re-
ceived trials with regular and irregular intervals between a warning
signal (instructing the subject to get ready) and the imperative stimu-
lus (instructing the subject to respond). David Shakow and colleagues
noticed that, unlike controls, patients were unable to beneﬁt from tem-
poral regularity of the intervals (called a set index) once they exceeded
a few seconds (Rodnick and Shakow, 1940; Shakow, 1962). Surprising-
ly, at the longer intervals, the patients were faster for the irregular ver-
sus regular trials, a pattern called the cross-over effect. This pattern of
performance was perplexing and it never received a clear explanation
(aside from largely descriptive explanations of failure to maintain
set), but it occupied a prominent role in experimental research, partly
because it was unexpected and wonderfully measurable.
This line of highly empirical research set the stage for clinical psy-
chopathology researchers who unabashedly borrowed from experi-
mental psychology, a practice that is commonplace now. This type
of translational research took many forms, including borrowing
frommodels of attention, perception, sensory gating, or emotional re-
actions (Braff, 1993; Green et al., 2011a; Kring and Neale, 1996;
Nuechterlein and Dawson, 1984; Nuechterlein et al., 1994). The goal
was to closely measure deﬁcits in schizophrenia in precise experi-
mental paradigms, and then infer what the results mean about under-
lying deﬁcits in the disorder based on existing experimental models.
By using normal cognition models as the framework, the results in
patients may implicate one visual process or one type of attentional
abnormality more than another.
A distinctly different slant on cognition in schizophrenia was tak-
ing hold at the same time as the experimental psychology/
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cused, this other approach had its roots in clinical neuropsychology.
Human clinical neuropsychology emerged in the post war era, forti-
ﬁed by numerous illustrative case studies of focal lesions from combat
injuries (Luria, 1980). In this context, it is not surprising that a cottage
industry of studies emerged that compared schizophrenia to neuro-
logical patients on standardized clinical neuropsychological assess-
ments. These types of comparisons were in keeping with the
common referral questions for psychiatric patients, which were for
the purpose of differential diagnosis. Typically the neuropsychologist
was asked to determine whether cognitive impairments in a patient
were “organic” meaning neurological versus “functional” meaning
not neurological. This type of question sounds jarring from a modern
viewpoint – it assumes that cognitive deﬁcits are not a core part of
schizophrenia, that cognitive deﬁcits for psychiatric patients are not
brain-based, and that this distinction between organic and functional
is both meaningful and informative. The demise of the word “organic”
in the research literature reﬂects a fundamental shift in assumptions.
Beyond the conceptual problems, the endeavor to distinguish two
types of cognitive impairment was largely futile. After a very large
number of studies, the inescapable conclusion was neuropsychologi-
cal tests could not distinguish cognitive impairments that accompany
schizophrenia from those that accompany head injury (Goldstein,
1986; Heaton et al., 1978). In retrospect, it is an unsurprising conclu-
sion and the efforts to discriminate schizophrenia from head injury
reﬂect a time-limited zeitgeist. Although problems in differential di-
agnosis could be attributed to the tests themselves, the problem in
this line of research was the conceptual framing and the stated
goals, not the assessment methods. The measures for the most part
were reliable and would have been informative for different types
of research questions, such as those considered in the next section.
Neither of these approaches paid much attention to clinical symp-
toms. We can speculate about the reasons for the omission. First is
that the people conducting the studies were mainly clinical and ex-
perimental psychologists and not directly involved in treating schizo-
phrenia. Second is that the overlap between cognition and psychotic
symptoms tend to be rather modest (Gold, 2004; O'Leary et al.,
2000). Third is that, at least for the experimental psychology ap-
proach, the emphasis was on cognitive vulnerability factors that
would be relatively impervious to changes in clinical state (reminis-
cent of Bleuler). Fourth is that there was not much effort to parse dif-
ferent types of clinical symptoms until the re-focusing on negative
and disorganized symptoms in the 1980s (Andreasen and Olsen,
1982; Crow, 1980). Although cognition and clinical symptoms can
safely be considered different domains of schizophrenia, we learned
later that there is value in considering areas of shared variance,
such as negative and disorganized symptoms.
1.3. Ramping up to the present: 1980s and 1990s
It is impossible to adequately summarize the ferment and the ex-
citement that characterized the research in cognition in schizophre-
nia during the latter part of the 20th century. In a selective review
such as this one, many key ﬁndings and research directions unfortu-
nately will be omitted. For the purposes of illustration, we have se-
lected 3 themes that took root in this period and will also be
discussed in terms of current research.
1.3.1. Cognition and neuroscience
Nothing makes a point quite like a picture of the brain. And what
made a very big impression were the initial pictures of the brains of
people with schizophrenia (Johnstone et al., 1976; Weinberger et
al., 1979). Their brains simply looked different – for example the ven-
tricles appeared to be larger in schizophrenia (Raz and Raz, 1990;
Weinberger et al., 1979). The larger ventricles reﬂected the relative
reduction of brain tissue to cerebral spinal ﬂuid. Further, the brainchanges were often associated with cognitive impairment, thereby
giving cognitive deﬁcits ﬁrm neural footing. Consider how the world
view for cognition in schizophrenia changed with these neuroimag-
ing applications. Only a few years previously, investigators were ad-
ministering tests to separate the organic from functional origins of
impairment. Suddenly it was obvious that many schizophrenia pa-
tients have brains that are not entirely normal and these give rise to
cognitive problems. Nonetheless, the inferences were limited from
these early studies: for one, the ratio of ventricle to brain is entirely
non-speciﬁc regarding the affected brain regions, as well as diagnosis.
Also the spatial resolution of these imaging techniques (computer-
ized tomography) was very limited compared with later methods.
The early structural ﬁndings were soon followed by functional
neuroimaging studies. Initially these were studies of positron emis-
sion tomography (PET) in schizophrenia (Berman et al., 1986;
Weinberger et al., 1986). Similar to the effects of the early structural
imaging, the functional neuroimaging studies forced a reconsidera-
tion of brains in schizophrenia. Not only did the brains look different
from healthy brains, they functioned differently as well. A common
observation was that schizophrenia patients did not activate their
frontal lobes as much, and as reliably, as control samples (i.e.
hypofrontality) (Andreasen et al., 1992; Buchsbaum et al., 1992; Gur
and Pearlson, 1993). Much like the ﬁndings of enlarged ventricles,
hypofrontality was wholly non-speciﬁc for diagnosis (other disorders
also showed it), and for mechanisms (there are too many different
ways to have reduced frontal activity). Also, functional magnetic res-
onance imaging (fMRI) would soon replace PET for cognitive activa-
tion studies in schizophrenia, although PET is still the method of
choice for other types of studies, such as those assessing drug recep-
tor occupancy. The variety of neuroscientiﬁc methods used currently
to study schizophrenia is huge, and ranges frommolecular neurobiol-
ogy to genomics, to a focus on systems and networks. But this re-
search direction was launched with the early neuroimaging studies
and the striking realization that the brain in schizophrenia (as well
as its cognitive processes) is available for rigorous study – just as it
is in any other brain-based disorder.
1.3.2. Cognition and outcome in schizophrenia
The introduction of antipsychotic medications in the 1950s carried
great promise and high expectations. Some of that promise was real-
ized: the antipsychotic medications did indeed reduce psychotic
symptoms in the majority of patients with schizophrenia (Braslow,
1997). It was natural to expect that psychotic symptom reduction
would be accompanied by functional improvements and community
integration. But that did not happen – in fact, the introduction of
these powerful medications made rather little difference for commu-
nity integration (Hegarty et al., 1994; Jaaskelainen et al., 2013). The
reasons were elusive: if the clinical psychotic symptoms were not
holding patients back from community reentry, then what was?
This puzzle highlighted the difference between remission, meaning
the reduction of symptoms, versus recovery, meaning full community
participation.
We know from numerous studies that cognitive impairment is an
important correlate and determinant of functioning in schizophrenia
(Green, 1996; Green et al., 2000, 2004). Though perhaps not intuitive,
cognition is a much better correlate of outcome than psychotic symp-
toms. We also know that antipsychotic medications have minimal ef-
fects on cognition (Keefe et al., 2007a,b). Herein lies the explanation
for the discrepancy – antipsychotic medications treat psychotic
symptoms, but not cognition. Cognition is related to outcome, but
psychotic symptoms are not consistently related. That is why the in-
troduction of antipsychotic medications changed the level of symp-
tomatology for inpatient units, but did little for overall recovery rates.
This association between cognition and outcome is robust – it was
replicated and extended in many in countries, using many different
types of assessments, in different patient groups across phase of
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The ﬁndings from the last couple of decades established the link be-
tween cognition and functioning. As will be seen in the next section
on current studies, the questions have shifted fromwhether cognition
is related to outcome to how cognition is related to outcome. Further,
not all types of cognition are equally important when it comes to nav-
igating the real world.
1.3.3. Cognition and interventions
Once it was established that cognition is a core feature of
schizophrenia and that it is related to functional recovery, it
followed naturally to ask whether treatments can enhance cogni-
tion. After all, if cognition was holding people with schizophrenia
back from full participation in their daily lives, then cognition
enhancement should eliminate this barrier. Intervention studies
for cognition in schizophrenia can be grouped into two general
categories that we will consider separately: cognitive remediation
and psychopharmacology.
The studies on cognitive remediation from the 1980s and 1990s in-
cluded highly focused experimental manipulations on a particular task,
as well as broad rehabilitation programs that borrowed heavily from
cognitive rehabilitation with brain-injured patients (Ben-Yishay et al.,
1985; Green, 1993, 1998). For experimental manipulations, investiga-
tors explored the modiﬁability of performance on cognitive tasks (e.g.,
reaction time, problem solving, vigilance, verbal memory) using a
range of approaches (such as coaching, monetary reinforcement, or in-
structions on performance strategies). For example, the Wisconsin
Card Sorting Test was the testing ground for a variety of manipulations
– results usually showed that patients' performance can be improved
(Goldberg et al., 1987; Green et al., 1992). These studies demonstrated
that the performance deﬁcits were not ﬁxed, and also that the improve-
ments sometimes persisted over time.
In contrast to the focused efforts to demonstrate modiﬁability
on a task, more comprehensive and longer-lasting cognitive pro-
grams were also applied to schizophrenia patients (Brenner et al.,
1990; Hogarty et al., 2004; van der Gaag et al., 2002). These pro-
grams were usually applied to small groups of patients and were
extensions of the psychiatric rehabilitation programs. Beyond the
typical procedures and structure of psychiatric rehabilitation, they
included cognitive exercises that could be done in the group
format.
These early approaches might appear overly focused (for the task
manipulations) and less than novel (for the rehabilitation programs),
but they established the ground work for later studies by demonstrat-
ing: 1) that task performance for schizophrenia patients can be mod-
iﬁed, even on tasks that reﬂected core and relatively enduring
impairments, and 2) the training exercises were well tolerated by pa-
tients, similar to other ongoing psychosocial interventions.
Regarding psychopharmacological approaches to cognition en-
hancement in schizophrenia – it started with a mirage. With the
introduction of second-generation antipsychotic medications,
many people (including the authors of this article) thought they
had cognitive beneﬁts when compared to ﬁrst-generation medica-
tions. Initial suggestions of this effect came from examining pa-
tients who were placed on clozapine, and who showed cognitive
beneﬁts in some cognitive domains and not others (Goldberg et
al., 1993; Hagger et al., 1993). Evaluations of the cognitive effects
of risperidone and olanzapine followed as they were introduced
to market (Green et al., 2002; Purdon et al., 2000). Comparisons
of second- to ﬁrst-generation medications (some controlled and
some not) added support to the idea that the more recent medica-
tions had cognitive beneﬁts (Harvey and Keefe, 2001; Woodward
et al., 2005). However, there were also some warning signs. First,
the interpretation of the results was limited by relatively small
sample sizes, and many of the earlier studies were uncontrolled.
Second, concerns persisted that the doses of the medicationswere not well-matched (with relatively higher, and perhaps more
sedating, dosing for the ﬁrst-generation medication). These prob-
lems were addressed more directly in recent studies that are cov-
ered in the next section.
Almost all of the focus on psychopharmacology was on second-
generation medications, as opposed to novel drugs with distinctly
different mechanisms of action. In retrospect, this tunnel vision
was unfortunate. However, there are several possible reasons for
it: First, the introduction of second-generation medications gener-
ated genuine optimism about previously unmet treatment needs,
including cognition and negative symptoms. There was a hope
(or even an expectation) that the clinicians could get all the treat-
ment needs for schizophrenia met in a single pill. Second, because
these drugs were on the market (or close to coming on the market),
pharmaceutical companies had an interest in funding investigator-
initiated grants to demonstrate the full range of effects. Finally, there
was a scientiﬁc basis to expect cognition enhancement. For example,
animal studies indicated that second-generation medications could
reverse induced cognitive deﬁcits in a way that ﬁrst-generation med-
ications could not (Young et al., 2009). So, it was not entirely amirage;
but it turned out to be overly optimistic.2. Cognition in schizophrenia: present
Current research on cognition in schizophrenia naturally has
grown out of its past. There are many areas of investigation at the pre-
sent that clearly deﬁne the ﬁeld. These include the deﬁnition and as-
sessment of social cognition, cognitive and affective neuroscience,
treatment of cognitive and social cognitive deﬁcits, and the inﬂuences
of genomic factors on cognition and its end-product in schizophrenia,
everyday disability, and phase of illness. We will discuss each of these
domains brieﬂy.2.1. Social cognition
Social cognition refers broadly to the domains of cognitive functions
that are employed in socially relevant situations (Harvey and Penn,
2010). These include emotion processing, social perception, theory of
mind/mental state attribution, and attributional style/bias, as well as
more complex and developing concepts such as social metacognition
(Pinkham et al., in press). It is clear that social cognition is of consider-
able importance for understanding social outcomes (Couture et al.,
2006), with the correlation between impairments in social cognitive
processes and functional outcomes more substantial than the correla-
tions between neurocognitive deﬁcits and these same outcomes (Fett
et al., 2011). The study of social cognition is quite robust, in that
more articles on social cognition are submitted to journals such as
this one than articles focused only on neurocognition.
At the same time, the study of social cognition is in some ways less
developed than that of neurocognition. A National Institute of Mental
Health (NIMH) task force concluded that the domains of social cogni-
tion were less well deﬁned than in neurocognition and that, as out-
comes measures, many social cognitive tasks have some major
deﬁciencies (Green et al., 2008). These include poor psychometric
properties, and apparently similar outcomemeasures with minor var-
iations, but few comparisons among them. In fact, an expert survey of
social cognition produced 168 different domains and 108 different
outcomes measures, with many of these domains and measures
being very closely related to each other (Pinkham et al., in press).
The similarity of many of these measures to each other has led to
challenges in direct comparisons of their usefulness, as many of
these assessments have overlapping content. Several efforts are un-
derway to identify optimal social cognition measures and these stud-
ies will add clarity to the ﬁeld.
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Considerable progress has been made regarding the functional
and structural neuroimaging of cognition in healthy samples. The in-
creased understanding of normal regional brain activity and function-
ally connected neural networks has been applied to developments in
schizophrenia research. For example, the Cognitive Neuroscience
Treatment Research to Improve Cognition in Schizophrenia
(CNTRICS) Initiative attempted to validate selective cognitive tests
that are tied to speciﬁc neural networks and subprocesses (Carter
and Barch, 2007). A data-collection extension of this initiative devel-
oped 4 performance-based tasks and examined their correlation with
measures of both everyday functioning and performance-based mea-
sures of functional capacity (Gold et al., 2012). Although the correla-
tions among indices of disability and performance on these measures
were modest, the fact that this initiative could identify highly selec-
tive cognitive measures that were linked to speciﬁc neural systems
reﬂects the substantial progress in this area.
Aside from cognitive neuroscience, the rapid emergence of social
and affective neuroscience is now inﬂuencing schizophrenia research
(Ochsner, 2008). These domains of inquiry focus on the neural sub-
strates of social and emotional processes in healthy and impaired
populations. For example, considerable work has gone into the pat-
terns of neural activation during identiﬁcation of facial emotion in
schizophrenia (Anticevic et al., 2012; Taylor et al., 2012). Given the
prominence of social processing and affective impairments in schizo-
phrenia, this research direction can help to identify underlying neural
abnormalities that give rise to social and emotional functioning. There
are also rich possibilities to examine the intersection of cognition and
emotion, including whether emotion dysregulation is associated with
difﬁculties regulating cognitive efforts, the cognitive impact of nega-
tive or traumatic emotional experiences, and the impact of differ-
ences in emotional reactivity on the ability to perform cognitive
operations. In addition, examination of underlying commonalities
and differences in brain activation during emotional and cognitive
tasks could inform treatments jointly aimed at emotional factors
and cognitive deﬁcits. Overall, social and affective neuroscience are
expanding rapidly in basic behavioral science, and they are well posi-
tioned to shed light on the neural basis of both social and motivation-
al problems associated with schizophrenia (Green et al., 2013).
2.3. Treatment of cognitive and functional deﬁcits
Interventions targeting the disability of schizophrenia have been
attempted for decades as described above. However, many interven-
tions were aimed at social, vocational, and residential skills deﬁcits in
the absence of any interventions aimed at cognition. As cognitive im-
pairments are primary correlates of functional deﬁcits, it stands to
reason that cognitive deﬁcits might well underlie the skills deﬁcits
that lead to disability and might be “rate limiters” of treatment im-
provements. Meta-analyses of interventions aimed at disability re-
duction have suggested that, in general, treatment of cognitive and
skills deﬁcits should proceed in parallel to yield functional beneﬁts
(Wykes et al., 2011).
Cognitive remediation therapies have made substantial gains in
the past two decades. Advancing past repetitive drill and practice in-
terventions, the current cognitive remediation interventions share
several critical features. They include dynamic difﬁculty titration,
elimination of focus on “training the test”, feedback and encourage-
ment, and a user-friendly interface with visually appealing graphics.
These features combine to promote engagement and levels of adher-
ence with treatment that are greater than before.
Training on speciﬁc cognitive skills is consistently found to be ef-
fective for improving cognition, but not necessarily for improving
functioning. Studies of both comprehensive rehabilitation interven-
tions and targeted skills training programs show that short termtreatments generally show functional gains only when additional
skills training is included (e.g., Bell et al., 2008; McGurk et al.,
2007). This situation may be offset by ﬁndings that substantial
doses of cognitive remediation (50 hours or more) are associated
with both substantial cognitive changes (cognition change of up to
d N 0.80) and improvements in functional skills (Fisher et al., 2009).
Clearly an important issue to be resolved is whether a substantial
dose of cognitive remediation can by itself improve daily life. In
other words, does an improvement of 10 IQ points yield functional
gains if the time frame for detecting these gains is long enough? It
will be important for regulatory approval (and payer participation)
to know whether concomitant skills training programs are necessary
to realize the full beneﬁts of cognitive remediation.
An important related issue concerns approval by regulatory agen-
cies for treatments for cognition in schizophrenia. The overall goal of
the NIMH Measurement and Treatment Research to Improve Cogni-
tion in Schizophrenia (MATRICS) Initiative was to construct a regula-
tory pathway for cognitive enhancement (Marder and Fenton, 2004).
Although MATRICS was aimed at pharmacological treatments, there
does not appear to be a substantial distinction in the approval process
for pharmacological and remediation-oriented interventions. At pre-
sent both pharmacological and remediation-oriented strategies are
under consideration for approval, though none have been approved
so far. Pharmacological interventions would be considered as thera-
pies added to a foundation of antipsychotic treatment for symptom
management. Cognitive remediation interventions delivered with a
computer, in person, or remotely would be considered to be medical
devices and would be approved accordingly. As treatments are ap-
proved for cognition, one of the critical issues is the extent to which
payers or regulators will expect to see functional gains to maintain
approval for treatments with pharmacological or remediation-
focused cognitive enhancing treatments.
2.4. Genomic inﬂuences on cognition
Studies of the genomic inﬂuences on schizophrenia represent a
large share of the research allocation on the condition, with samples
of patients in the tens of thousands. Cognitive deﬁcits are clearly central
to the illness and meet several critical criteria for being considered as
important “endophenotypes” (Braff et al., 2007). They are stable, pre-
sent in attenuated form in relatives, presumed to be genetically simpler
than the illness phenotype, and measured with high reliability. In addi-
tion, they are among the most heritable of all illness-related traits, at
least in families affected by severe mental illness.
The heritability of a variety of cognitive functions in families of
people with schizophrenia been demonstrated in a multiple studies
(Gur et al., 2007). Memory, attention, and executive functions seem
to have a strong familial component that is substantially heritable.
In addition, while disability is a complex phenotype, the skills under-
lying disability may be less complex. The components of disability, in-
cluding everyday living skills and employment appear to be quite
heritable behavioral traits (McGrath et al., 2009). The skills that un-
derlie disability include cognition, as well as the ability to perform
cognitively demanding everyday living skills.
Previous studies have identiﬁed genomic variation associated with
cognitive endophenotypes (Greenwood et al., 2011). These include ver-
bal memory, working memory, indices of attention / vigilance, and so-
cial cognitive processes. Further, sensory gating endophenotypes, such
as P50 suppression and startle blink responses, also have strong geno-
mic linkages. The full value of these ﬁndings will depend on their rep-
lication, and several related studies are in process.
2.5. Functional capacity
The study of functional capacity has increased substantially in the
last decade. This concept refers to the ability to perform functionally
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idential functions (Harvey et al., 2009; McKibbin et al., 2004). Multi-
ple sophisticated performance-based assessments have been
developed (Green et al., 2011b), including computerized assessments
described for the ﬁrst time in this issue. Several studies have
suggested that these skills may be more proximal to real-world dis-
ability than cognitive deﬁcits and they share features with cognitive
deﬁcits that suggest they are core features of the illness: stability
over time, minimally associated with symptoms, and similarities
cross-culturally.
Further, impairments in functional capacity performance meet
criteria for an endophenotype, including substantial temporal stabili-
ty (Light et al., 2012) and low levels of correlation with clinical symp-
toms (e.g., Bowie et al., 2008). Further, functional capacity scores
appear to be minimally related to environmental support (Harvey et
al., 2009), suggesting that having more support while performing
these skills does not inﬂuence the likelihood that people with severe
mental illness can perform them with competence. However, as
shown recently, limited opportunities for experience in demonstrat-
ing skills can contribute to functional skill deﬁcits on these tasks
(Holshausen et al., in press).
An important consideration is the suggestion that functional ca-
pacity and neurocognitive skills may both reﬂect a larger common
trait that we can call “ability.” Several studies with different sam-
ples have suggested that there may be one ability trait that cuts
across tasks labeled “neurocognitive” and those designated as
“functional” (Harvey et al., 2011). Although the types of tasks are
quite different, they can be modeled in a way that both connect
to one underlying trait in statistical models (Green et al., 2012).
Further, cognitive and functional capacity indices were equivalently
stable and similarly associated with the single factor over 6-week
and 6-month follow-up assessments using sophisticated statistical
analyses (Harvey et al., 2013).
2.6. Phase of illness
Previously, there was little need to discriminate the phase of ill-
ness of the patients. If schizophrenia developed, it stayed around
and it may have actually worsened. Nowwe can detect risk states ear-
lier, although imprecisely, and are better able to differentiate the ef-
fects of treatment, duration of illness, and are early course of illness
on cognitive functioning (Cannon et al., 2008). Now we clearly
know that the signature of cognitive impairment is not markedly dif-
ferent prior to the onset of diagnosable illness. We also know that, in
the absence of the relatively rare phenomenon of nearly complete
treatment resistance in older age, there is little consistent evidence
of cognitive decline (Harvey et al., 2010).
Groups are also working on identifying cognitive predictors of
conversion from what looks like a schizophrenia prodrome to a psy-
chotic state. The literature suggests that probably we are looking
too late: individuals who are considered to be prodromal and already
have cognitive deﬁcits seem more likely to convert to psychosis;
those without the deﬁcits seem at lower risk (Seidman et al., 2010).
One of our goals in the next decade will be in closing the gap on con-
vergence between clinical and cognitive deﬁcits in cases who are
about to convert to psychosis and to “get there earlier” in the cogni-
tive prediction side.
3. The future – educated guesses
The baseball manager Yogi Berra famously observed that “It's tough
to make predictions, especially about the future.” Hence, the authors of
this article have little to gain, and can only be provedwrong, by sticking
our necks out and making predictions, especially about the future. Un-
daunted, we will make some general guesses at this point. The subse-
quent trend lines for research in cognition and schizophrenia will beplayed out in the pages of this new journal, and we will eventually
know what we got right and what we got wrong.
One general rule is that research into cognition in schizophrenia
follows, often closely in time, developments in basic biological sci-
ence. Hence, as advances in basic science (e.g., inﬂammatory markers,
optogenetics, epigenetics, pluripotent stem cells, advanced neuroim-
aging paradigms, etc.) are applied to schizophrenia, they will also be
applied to the cognition of schizophrenia. Once a biomarker is found
to be associated with the disease, the next step frequently is to eval-
uate whether it is related to cognitive impairment. Herein lies one of
the advantages of cognition compared with other features of the ill-
ness – it is seen as more directly related to known brain circuits. Be-
yond this general tendency to essentially travel on the coattails of
neuroscientiﬁc advances, we can identify a few promising directions.
3.1. Treatment – a 3rd path
Treatments for cognition in schizophrenia fall into two categories:
training interventions (such as cognitive remediation), and psycho-
pharmacology. However, we may soon see a focus on a third ap-
proach: neurostimulation. Such approaches include transcranial
magnetic stimulation (TMS), and transcranial direct current stimula-
tion (tDCS) (Minzenberg and Carter, 2012). These approaches at-
tempt to change cognition by directly stimulating the brain. In TMS
a strong, transient magnetic ﬁeld is applied to the scalp from a
hand-held coil. That application creates electric current in the brain,
which alters the membrane potential and leads to neuronal ﬁring.
In tDCS a low-intensity direct current is applied to the scalp, which
modulates neuronal excitability (either higher or lower, depending
on polarity), but does not cause ﬁring directly. The beneﬁcial effects
of these methods sometimes appear to be long lasting, but the results
are variable (Guse et al., 2010). The value of these approaches alone,
or in combination with other treatment modalities, is likely to be a
focus in coming years.
3.2. The interface of motivation and cognition
It is common to view cognition and motivation as separate
spheres. Indeed, motivation is much more linked to negative symp-
toms, such as asociality and avolition. But recent formulations suggest
that the two domains may be linked. For example, self-reported in-
trinsic motivation has an effect on the beneﬁts of cognitive remedia-
tion (Medalia and Brekke, 2010). In addition, it is possible that
impairments in cognition and social cognition, lead over time to de-
creases in motivation that we see as negative symptoms, including
asociality and anhedonia (Green et al., 2012). Recent developmental
models suggest that the two largest unmet treatment needs in schizo-
phrenia, cognition and motivational negative symptoms, are related,
and may emerge at different points in development (Beck et al.,
2009; Grant and Beck, 2009). That is, long-standing cognitive and so-
cial cognitive problems could lead to expectations (dysfunctional be-
liefs) in which the person learns to not expect to be successful or to
enjoy interactions. These beliefs, in turn, lead to motivational nega-
tive symptoms. The interaction and overlap between the science of
cognition and the science of motivation present wide open areas of
exploration for psychopathology.
3.3. Technology as a problem and a solution
Perhaps the most ubiquitous feature of worldwide culture in the
21st century is technology. Television shows for children feature
dogs who have blogs and nearly every aspect of life is technology
driven. As a result, elderly individuals and people with severe mental
illness are expected to perform on-line banking and ATM tasks, and to
engage in internet or phone voice menu tasks to schedule appoint-
ments and reﬁll predictions (Harvey and Keefe, 2012). In many
e7M.F. Green, P.D. Harvey / Schizophrenia Research: Cognition 1 (2014) e1–e9cases there are no alternatives offered other than internet-based ser-
vices. This relentless change creates a disadvantage for those with less
experience or less ability, but may, paradoxically, offer opportunities.
Technology can be less expensive and in an era when health costs are
a paramount concern, technology may offer an opportunity for ser-
vice delivery that would never be possible if in-person interventions
were required. For instance, remotely delivered cognitive enhance-
ment interventions have recently been shown to have clinical efﬁcacy
(see this issue). Thus, in contrast to the classical model of bricks and
mortar clinic, receptionist, therapist, and group interventions, people
with severe mental illness could be provided with a low priced device
loaded with software and be prompted and cued remotely to self-
administer the intervention. This type of intervention has been ap-
plied with success for years in aging populations with low levels of
experience with technology (Czaja et al., 2006).
3.4. Applications of animal models
It is obvious that animal models of cognition have had a profound
impact on our understanding of human cognition. However, they
have had a limited impact on the study of cognitive impairment in
schizophrenia. To understand the multitude of genetic and molecular
mechanisms associated with cognitive impairment in schizophrenia,
neural circuit assays (i.e., behavioral tasks known to depend on spe-
ciﬁc circuits) are needed, and those often come from animal models
(Moore et al., 2013). Such models are valuable for neural demonstra-
tions of construct validity (whether the identiﬁed cognitive processes
are homologous between species), as well as pre-clinical indications
of predictive validity (whether a drug is likely to have a therapeutic
beneﬁt in human patients) (Keeler and Robbins, 2011). Given an in-
creasing focus on construct validity at the neural level, and increasing
examples of successful translation and back-translation, this area
could assume a much larger emphasis for the study of cognition in
schizophrenia in coming years.
3.5. Diagnoses
An intriguing, though perhaps unsettling, thought about the fu-
ture of cognition research in schizophrenia is that it might not exist
at all. That is, it might not be on schizophrenia per se. One of the im-
plications of the NIMH Research Domains Criteria (RDoC) Project is
that speciﬁc diagnoses, such as schizophrenia, will not ﬁt into the
growing knowledge from neuroscience, and instead the ﬁeld will
move to brain-based constructs that cut across diagnostic boundaries
(Cuthbert and Insel, 2010; Insel et al., 2010). A better understanding
of these domains might lead to a reorganization of the diagnostic
groupings in a way that better carves psychopathology at its neuro-
scientiﬁc joints. In such a reorganization, schizophrenia as a separate
disorder could be clumped into a mixed category of psychoses, or
split into the meaningful and biologically validated subtypes.
It is easy for this pendulum to swing too far in either direction. A
narrow focus on biomarkers or RDoC dimensions risks an
overreliance on reductionism that overlooks important higher-order
and functional aspects of the disease. In contrast, a narrow focus on
clinical syndromes and traditional diagnostic categories risks an
overreliance on surface-level clinical features and a continued failure
to identify neurobiologically meaningful dimensions or subtypes.
Resolving this balancing act will not occur immediately, and
schizophrenia is not disappearing as a diagnosis any time soon. In-
stead, there will be continued efforts to start with existing diagnoses
and to revise them incrementally. In this mode, cognition might be-
come a more central part of schizophrenia in diagnostic systems.
That very nearly happened for the latest version of the Diagnosis
and Statistical Manual (DSM-5) in which cognition was one of several
dimensions that was initially slated for inclusion, but ultimately
moved out of the main body of the text to Section 3, meaning that itrequires additional study (Barch et al., 2013). In contrast to DSM,
the proposed revision for the International Classiﬁcation of Diseases
(ICD-11) includes level of cognitive impairment as a speciﬁer
(Gaebel, 2012). If that change in ICD-11 is maintained through the
ﬁeld trials and revision process, it will mark the ﬁrst time that clini-
cians internationally will be asked to note and record the cognitive
status of schizophrenia patients as a routine part of evaluation.
4. Conclusions
Schizophrenia in the past was a grim diagnosis with a poor prog-
nosis. At the present time, it can probably be better described as a se-
rious condition, with plenty of reasons to be hopeful. The breadth and
depth of valuable information on this disease, as in other areas of sci-
ence, is experiencing rapid, almost exponential, growth. We probably
learned more about schizophrenia in the past 10 years than we
learned in the previous 100. Like any other area of biomedical science,
the sheer volume of the scientiﬁc output, as well as the rate of change,
is daunting and intimidating. Most of us are conducting research on
topics that did not exist, or were not discussed, when we were in
training. The future holds both considerable promise and substantial
challenge. This new journal will track those developments, help to or-
ganize the massive amount of information, and provide a forum for
their dissemination and impact.
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